Conceptual and Biofunctional Embodiment: A Long Story on the Transience of the Enduring Mind by Asghar Iran-Nejad & Auriana B. Irannejad
fpsyg-07-01990 January 6, 2017 Time: 11:52 # 1
PERSPECTIVE
published: 10 January 2017
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2016.01990
Edited by:
Serge Thill,
University of Skövde, Sweden
Reviewed by:
Daniele Caligiore,
National Research Council, Italy
Henrik Svensson,
University of Skövde, Sweden
*Correspondence:
Asghar Iran-Nejad
airan-ne@ua.edu
Specialty section:
This article was submitted to
Cognitive Science,
a section of the journal
Frontiers in Psychology
Received: 06 September 2016
Accepted: 06 December 2016
Published: 10 January 2017
Citation:
Iran-Nejad A and Irannejad AB (2017)
Conceptual and Biofunctional
Embodiment: A Long Story on
the Transience of the Enduring Mind.
Front. Psychol. 7:1990.
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2016.01990
Conceptual and Biofunctional
Embodiment: A Long Story on the
Transience of the Enduring Mind
Asghar Iran-Nejad1* and Auriana B. Irannejad2
1 Department of Educational Studies in Psychology, Research Methodology, and Counseling, The University of Alabama,
Tuscaloosa, AL, USA, 2 Department of Psychology, The University of Alabama at Birmingham, Birmingham, AL, USA
We examine how embodiment in biological activity is different from conceptual
embodiment as reflected in classic, modern, and postmodern perspectives on tacit
knowledge. The central theme of the essay is how understanding is embodied
conceptually and biofunctionally. We focus (a) on how biofunctional understanding
(BU) is different from conceptual understanding (CU) and (b) on how the overall
differences between these two types of embodied understanding are complementary.
We show here from a conceptual perspective that embodiment theories have diverged
on the meaning of embodiment; but convergence may be more likely across future
perspectives if we first redefine the construct of tacit knowledge as tacit understanding
and then define (explicit) CU as being directly grounded in tacit understanding, for
the purpose of comparison with BU defined as being grounded in biological activity.
We illustrate the complementary differences between conceptual and biofunctional
embodiment of understanding first in the absence of language and then using a
particular statement format and the implicit analogy of biofunctional embodiment in other
bodily systems. We conclude with a suggestion about the directly uncovered but highly
related embodiment of language in a section on future research.
Keywords: biofunctional understanding, conceptual understanding, embodied understanding, ongoing
biofunctional activity, momentary constellation firing, ease of understanding dimension, collective organization,
collective announcement
The core idea that understanding originates in knowledge and grows with it goes back at least to
the first generation of researchers following the cognitive revolution of the 1960s (Bransford and
Johnson, 1972). According to the standard theory then, abstract knowledge schemas available for
retrieval from long-term memory had placeholders or slots in them for worldly objects, events,
or symbols to fill. These schemas were actively retrieved and used in the course of constructive
information processing. As the title of the Bransford and Johnson’s (1972) article suggests, these
abstract symbolic structures were contextual prerequisites for understanding; and understanding
was described as schema-instantiation or slot filling (Pichert and Anderson, 1977; Anderson et al.,
1978). However, as Prawat (2000) carefully emphasized decades later and this perspective essay
aims to elaborate, the crux of the matter is that none of this information processing manipulation
amounted to understanding.
TRANSITION TO SECOND GENERATION COGNITIVE SCIENCE
The inability of the abstract schemas to account for understanding may have been one of the
reasons why researchers grew dissatisfied with the formalism of the first generation cognitive
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science. In the late 1970s, the field experienced a critical transition
from the first to second generation cognition. According
to Neisser (1976), information processing had momentum
and prestige but lacked in commitment to human nature.
Accordingly, almost as if overnight, the rapidly growing field of
cognition turned controversial over structural permanence (Iran-
Nejad, 1980/1987) and other static features of long-term memory
schemas (Black and Wilensky, 1979; Thorndyke and Yekovich,
1980; Posner et al., 1982; Wilensky, 1983; Brewer and Nakamura,
1984). Mental schemas were debated from every conceivable
angle including meaning leanness (Anderson et al., 1978; Alba
and Hasher, 1983), neglect of affect (Zajonc, 1980), symbol
grounding (Searle, 1980; Harnad, 1990), inflexibility (Iran-Nejad
et al., 1981/1984), connectionist-network infrastructure (Minsky,
1980), decontextualization (Brown et al., 1989), and, finally,
disembodiment (Clark, 1998).
A retrospective look at the above transitional literature
suggests two remarkable considerations. First, the literature,
especially the symbol-grounding literature, reads like being
deeply concerned about understanding without using the term
understanding. Second, some leading investigators were groping
like they had experienced a sudden enlightenment or even
disillusion that their already popular first generation cognitive
science was no longer worthy of their attention and that they were
better off with some other equally popular replacement. Thus,
Anderson spoke of a radical shift in his schema-instantiation
theory from favoring extreme abstractness (Anderson, 1977) to
a later emphasis on richness of exemplars (Anderson, 1984).
Similarly, Rumelhart introduced a similarly radical shift from his
symbolic story grammar or his theory of monolithic schemas
(Rumelhart, 1975, 1980; Iran-Nejad et al., 1992; Do and Rahm,
2007) to a new focus (see, especially, Rumelhart, 1984, conference
paper) on subsymbolic parallel distributed processing (PDP)
connectionism (Rumelhart and McClelland, 1986). By the same
token, to cite one other example, elaborating on their conceptual
change theory (Posner et al., 1982), Strike and Posner (1992)
stated that they “were interested in a phenomenon that is
analogous to Kuhn’s notion of a paradigm shift” (p. 148). The
fact that these pioneering scholars turned away from their already
influential work is evidence for a sudden enlightenment; and the
fact that they each headed in a different direction in search of
something revolutionary like PDP connectionism may be taken
as evidence for the lack of direction about where the field was
better off heading.
KNOWLEDGE SCHEMAS AND
UNDERSTANDING
Two lines of inquiry focused directly on understanding during
the transition period. One of these was by Black and Wilensky
(1979) who suggested that the abstract story schema may be a
consequence of story understanding rather than a prerequisite
cause for it. Focusing on Rumelhart’s (1975) story-grammar,
these researchers reasoned that the structure of a story may
presuppose understanding the story such that “there is no reason
to determine the structure because we must have understood
the story before we can discover the structure” (p. 228). The
second line of research on surprise-ending story understanding
was derived from biofunctional theory (Johnson, 2015). Using
the vivid analogy of the camera as the prerequisite system
and the pictures it takes as its postfunctional product, Iran-
Nejad (1980/1987) made the same point about the irrelevance
of abstract structures as made by Black and Wilensky (1979),
explaining that the structure of the pictures a camera takes
is unlikely to tell us anything about how the camera takes
pictures—without using picture templates. Later, Rumelhart
(1984) explained how schemas may emerge from subsymbolic
“neural networks” but did not discuss how subsymbolic neuron-
less networks understood stories (Wilensky, 1983; Iran-Nejad,
1989).
THE RISE OF EMBODIED COGNITION
The transition period exposed a number of problems with
abstract schema theories, chief among which being the need
for a solution to the symbol-grounding problem. In the 1990s,
cognition researchers used the occasion of this transition to
introduce embodiment for a solution. The demand for the new
solution was widespread; and before long embodied cognition
swept the planet (Wilson, 2002; Adams, 2010). Making the
embodiment solution to fit new problems demanded a working
definition for the term embodiment. Without a satisfying
definition, embodiment could not be a solution to symbol
grounding or any of the other problems raised during the
transition period. Again, scholars followed divergent paths in
search of a definition none of which touched upon embodied
understanding (Johnson, 2015), as demonstrated in three reviews
of the literature by Wilson (2002), Kiverstein (2012), and Gärtner
(2013). Wilson (2002) identified six definitions for the term. Of
these, four she evaluated as the least-partially true, one as most
problematic, and one as the least explored but most promising.
A decade later, Kiverstein (2012) wondered exactly what
researchers meant when they said that cognition is embodied,
described the enterprise in terms of four E’s (embodied,
embedded, extended, enacted) and one A (affective), matching,
like Wilson (2002), rather closely the diversity of the transition
era. At about the same time, Gärtner (2013) distinguished
another six different meanings, some he saw as promising
but each standing alone waiting for elusive integration. In the
meantime, the gaps between internal knowledge representations
and conceptual understanding (CU), on the one hand, and
between knowledge-enabled understanding and biology-enabled
understanding, on the other, proved much tougher than the
cognitive revolution of the 1960s had initially anticipated
(Bransford and Johnson, 1972; Bobrow and Collins, 1975).
TACIT KNOWLEDGE AND TACIT
UNDERSTANDING
Readers may be able to discern some semblance of unity in
diversity surrounding a definition for embodiment grounded
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in tacit knowledge—knowledge that cannot be directly told
or verbalized. Related to the present discussion, a particularly
readable essay on tacit knowledge is a commentary by Prawat
(2000) on Iran-Nejad’s (2000) biofunctional-understanding
theory. According to this theory, (a) the hallmark of a genuine
event of understanding is the extraordinary click of understanding
(ECOU, let us say echo) we experience inside at varying levels of
strikingness and (b) the hallmark of the ECOU itself is a paradox
of a missing “how” function. According to Iran-Nejad (2000):
Consider, for example, the constructive learning metaphors I
know or I understand. They each signify the end result of some
unpacked internal process. It is meaningful to say “I know” or “l
understand,” especially if the object is understood. However, it is
not so meaningful to say, “I know how to know” or “I know how to
understand” (Iran-Nejad, 1978). The reason we cannot make the
latter statements is that we know nothing about the underlying
process by which we come to know or understand something. (p.
69).
We “know-that” we know and understand without,
paradoxically, “knowing-how” we know and understand.
To learn more about this paradox (Iran-Nejad and Bordbar,
2013), let us assume that there is a collective “how” organizer
function or, rather, a set of “what, how, why, when, where, who,
and which” organizer functions “underlying” (or perhaps “under-
standing”) the ECOU as a multiple-source capability. Iran-Nejad
(2000) proposed that the physical living system of subsystems and
microsystems (i.e., neurons) inside the skin of the understander
could directly be the collective multiple-source organizer of
the ECOU, implying essentially that the paradoxical ECOU is
directly biofunctional in nature. More to the point are the facts
(a) that the ECOU makes its entrance into cognition totally
unannounced, (b) that the set of collective-organizer functions
of the ECOU is missing in cognition in the sense that cognition
has no idea whatsoever about the black box that produces the
surprising ECOU when the latter makes its eventual appearance,
and (c) that the ECOU delivers with it some exciting surprises
of its own in terms of ideas and affects. These facts point to the
conclusion that the set of collective multiple-source organizer
functions must comprise a dynamic living system made for the
extraordinary capability to be most aptly called biofunctional
understanding (BU; Johnson, 2015). In his commentary, Prawat
(2000) did not dispute this conclusion about the nature and
relevance of the paradoxical ECOU solution (Iran-Nejad, 2013).
Rather, he stated:
lran-Nejad illustrates this problem with a simple comparison.
Thus, he writes, “The statements ‘I know how to elaborate’ and
‘l know how to understand’ have different effects on people’s
intuitive judgments of meaningfulness” (p. 70). The fact that
we do not know how we understand but we do know when
we understand—the “extraordinary click” referred to by lran-
Nejad—points to a process that lies beneath that of symbolic
manipulation (symbols chasing symbols). The lack of awareness
of how understanding occurs, coupled with the phenomenological
certainty that it does occur, is prima facie evidence that the process
takes place somewhere in addition to, if not other than, the
symbolic or propositional level. (p. 90).
In his perceptive commentary, Prawat (2000) endorsed
the biofunctional-understanding solution and recommended
broadening the problem to engage tacit-knowledge proponents
among first-generation modernists like Reber and colleagues
(Allen and Reber, 1980; Reber, 1989), transition era
subsymbolists like Rumelhart (1984), second generation
postmodernists like Lakoff and Johnson (1999), as well as
their classic inspirers like Polanyi (1968), Peirce (1898), Dewey
(1925/1981), and Wittgenstein (1963). In the process, it may turn
out that the directly inarticulable BU supports a more precise
construct of tacit understanding than the more popular concept
of tacit knowledge.
THE BIOFUNCTIONAL
UNDERSTANDING SPIRAL
Two independent lines of research (see, however, Maturana,
1978 cited in Iran-Nejad and Ortony, 1984) have directly
addressed biological embodiment. One, introduced by Maturana
and colleagues, focused on the concept of autopoiesis (Maturana
and Varela, 1980) and evolved into the literature on the
embodied mind (Maturana and Varela, 1987; Varela et al.,
1991, 1999). The other was introduced at about the same
time by Iran-Nejad and his colleagues and has developed
into BU (Alverson, 2015) and related areas like interest (Iran-
Nejad, 1987), affect (Diener and Iran-Nejad, 1986), and self-
regulation (Iran-Nejad and Chissom, 1992). In this section, we
describe how conceptual or knowledge-enabled understanding
and biofunctional or biology-enabled understanding are different
and complementary in their roles in the overall spiral of
understanding.
Iran-Nejad (2000) illustrated how the ongoing understanding
by a grazing prey animal that the environment is safe even amidst
surrounding predators interacts with momentary knowledge in
the absence of symbolic knowledge. The predator in wait also
has her own understanding of how safe the meal is as long
as there is no knowledge tipoff. So far there is no need to
assume prerequisite knowledge for understanding on the part of
either one of animals and there is all the reason to assume that
understanding is the prerequisite for knowledge on the part of
both. Thus, “the well-camouflaged predator may be completely
safe right in front of the eyes of the prey. But as soon as its
spots shift, it has already lost its meal” (p. 81) to the momentarily
conceived knowledge and the new understanding by the prey that
the area is unsafe.
In Figure 1, dark arrows moving clockwise represent ongoing
biofunctional activity (OBA) of understanding as it happens in
the alertly grazing animal over time. Multiple sources contribute
perpetually to OBA and knowing is but one of those sources.
Another source is the active “I” of the animal. Among other
contributing sources to BU are diverse sensory modalities and
other internal subsystems of the body (e.g., for hunger, thirst,
fear, joy) all contributing perpetually to the OBA. The OBA
collectively organizes contributions from multiple sources as the
collective how, why, when, which, who, and what of these sources
remain biofunctional secrets.
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FIGURE 1 | Iran-Nejad’s spiral of biofunctional understanding (BU).
Dark arrows circulating in the shape of the number 8 represent the
biofunctional spiral of understanding. Clockwise arrows represent the
collective organization of ongoing biofunctional activity (OBA) and
counterclockwise arrows represent momentary constellation firing (MCF) in
neurons. The full OBA–MCF spiral portrays two kinds of understanding. BU
happens, without any “know-how” whatsoever on the part of the
understander, in the nervous and bodily systems only. Clockwise arrows
separating their path to rise upward and to the right, again without any
“know-how” whatsoever by the understander, represent a type of OBA-fueled
MCF in neurons that “collectively announce” knowing by revelation in which
both cognition and affect emerge together. Dark arrows turning
counterclockwise—and moving forward under the knowing-how influence of
the active “I” (or executive function, EF)—represent understanding by active
refection on the part of the EF. “Knowing” as defined here is none other than
MCF-conceived self-awareness. Counterclockwise arrows sinking to turn
clockwise at the top left represent reflection-caused conceptual
understanding (CU). The sharp image of the brain is meant to represent an
integrated system of nervous and bodily subsystems and microsystems (i.e.,
neurons) not an isolated brain, nervous system, or body. Copyright 1980...
2016 by Asghar Iran-Nejad. Wholetheme Education Project. Image from
Iran-Nejad, A. (2016). “Writing as a body-mind performance learning activity
for educational development of wholetheme professional Artistry,” in Writing
for Professional development, eds G. Ortoleva, M. Betrancourt, P. Tynjala, and
S. Billett (Leiden: Brill), 61–87.
The dark clockwise arrows rising suddenly upward to the right
represent momentary constellation firing (MCF) in already alert
neurons. MCF collectively announces revelatory knowledge and
excitement (knowing by revelation in the figure). This happens
when the shift in predator spots, as one source, alarms the already
alert animal in the form of a momentary conception or revelation.
Again, the how, when, . . . of such collective announcements are
biofunctional secrets. What is important to know is that they
happen, do so as portrayed in the circulating arrows, and do so
in exquisite regularity.
The counterclockwise arrows moving leftward in Figure 1
represent knowing by reflection. This is when the already alarmed
animal (i.e., the active first-person of the “I”) considers by keeping
the arrows moving deliberately leftward to ascertain the safety
of the area. Finally, counterclockwise arrows sinking on the left
to turn clockwise represent CU by reflection. This is when the
prey animal reaches an understanding if the area is safe or unsafe
and the predator reaches the understanding if the meal is safe or
lost. And the social spiral continues perpetually in both animals
in different stories.
To illustrate how knowledge is a cause and consequence of
BU, let us start by examining the first-person statement I know
that I keep my body warm. This ambiguous statement may be
disambiguated in two ways in order to show grounding of the
symbols either in CU (see Figure 1) as in CU1 I know that I
keep my body seasonally warm or in BU as in BU1 I know that
I keep my body about 98.6◦ warm. As their labels imply, there
are some noteworthy differences in understanding between CU1
and BU1. With CU1, the active “I” can literally claim, as well
as stand by this claim, the skill of knowing-how to keep the
body warm as illustrated in the true CU2 I know how to keep
my body seasonally warm. By contrast, with BU1, the active “I”
can make the claim, more or less metaphorically, without being
able to stand by it as illustrated by the false BU2 I know how
to keep my body about 98.6◦ warm. BU2 is only metaphoric
because, despite the claim, neither the first-person of the active
“I” nor the third-person of anyone else, other than the body itself,
knows how to keep the body 98.6◦ warm—as of yet, only biology
and the almighty, so to speak, know how to do that (compare,
also, CU3 with BU3 and CU4 with BU4—not shown). CU3 I
know that I keep my body seasonally warm and I know how to
keep my body seasonally warm, e.g., by staying on the path of
migration (true, internally coherent, embodied in CU know-
how). BU3 I know that I keep my body about 98.6◦ warm and I
know how to keep my body about 98.6◦ warm (false, internally
incoherent, not embodied in CU know-how, embodied in
BU). Thus, for the grazing prey, the understandings—that (a)
the grazing ground is safe and (b) the temperature is right—
are collectively organized in the same way; but as soon as the
predator spots shift or the temperature changes, the active “I” of
the prey “knows-how” to decide based on moment-by-moment
“knowing-that” if and when it is time to move on or to stay put.
CU4 I know that I keep my body seasonally warm even though
I do not really know myself how to keep my body seasonably
warm (false, internally incoherent, embodied in CU know-
how).
A NEW PERSPECTIVE ON THE
TRANSIENCE OF THE ENDURING MIND
This “new perspective” was the theme encapsulated in the
title—“The schema: A structural or a functional pattern”—
of a technical report first published and widely circulated
in 1980 by the Center for the Study of Reading, University
of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. A lot has happened in
the interdisciplinary field of cognitive science in the almost
four decades since. Nevertheless, there is little risk in calling
the perspective new and use the still oven-fresh theme
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of transience to address how the similarities and differences
between CU and BU make them complementary. The answer
lies in the simultaneously transient and enduring way the two
interact in the spiral of BU. Represented by clockwise-moving
arrows, BU is the prerequisite ongoing source for sounding
CU clicks (or ECOUs) in the form of knowing by revelation
(see rising clockwise arrows in Figure 1). Similarly, CU is a
momentary cause of knowing by reflection, clockwise arrows
turning counterclockwise. Knowing is a momentary prerequisite
for BU by reflection, counterclockwise arrows turning clockwise.
In this way, BU is an enduring contributor to OBA which is
an enduring contributor to MCF, and the spiral continues but
for one exception: momentary knowing by reflection must be
regulated forward by the active “I” with prerequisite know-how
to cause BU, which accounts for the difference between the
above CU and BU statements. In this fashion, the dynamic or
spontaneous and active or deliberate spiral of understanding
continues its perpetual course.
A FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTION
A relevant topic here is the role of language in the BU spiral.
An intriguing concept we are finding useful is a hypothesized
biofunctional ease of understanding dimension to account for
the order inherent in developmental progression as it happens
in Piaget’s four stages of child development. This ease of
understanding dimension, defined as an OBA-MCF relationship,
can be more readily described with a metaphor in the limited
space of this essay. We can think of MCF as a biofunctional
propeller that pulls forward the OBA in proportion to the unity-
in-diversity fuel it can draw from it to collectively announce
rich postfunctional revelations in varying degrees of strikingness
(Iran-Nejad and Stewart, 2010). In their psycholinguistic studies
of language embodiment, Anna M Borghi, Claudia Scorolli, and
colleagues (Scorolli et al., 2011; Borghi et al., 2013), among others,
are developing methodology that lends itself remarkably well to
ease of understanding (or processing) studies.
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